Constructivist · 1987
Recursive self-invalidation
Suffering worsens when the symptom is interpreted through the very core constructs it invalidates again.
Recursive self-invalidation is a constructivist psychopathological proposal derived from Personal Construct Psychology which explains how a disorder can be maintained and aggravated because the person construes their own symptom through the very core constructs that the symptom throws into crisis. The formulation presented by Semerari and Mancini in 1987 and developed in 1988 together with Georgianna Gardner begins from a precise sequence: the invalidation of core constructions of the self activates a state of transition; the resulting disturbance is interpreted through those same constructions and becomes a further source of invalidation; the system is trapped in a vicious circle that selects and reinforces an ever smaller number of alternative points of view. The model shifts clinical attention from the search for an isolated cause of the symptom towards the meaning the patient attributes to it, the catastrophic predictions it triggers and the lack of alternative constructions from which to understand or modify it. Its scope is that of a framework for clinical and psychopathological formulation, not that of an autonomous therapeutic protocol or a complete theory of personality.
Theory of change
Change comes about when the symptom stops confirming the core construct in crisis and the person can construct alternatives from which to explain it and respond to it.
Core ideas
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The symptom is interpreted through the constructions that sustain identity
The disturbance is understood not only through medical, psychological or social knowledge, but through the core constructs with which the person maintains their view of themselves. Anxiety, depression, rituals, worry or the fear of losing control acquire particular clinical importance when they appear incompatible with the patient's preferred identity. (Gardner, G. G., Mancini, F., & Semerari, A., 1988, Construction of Psychological Disorders as Invalidation of Self-Knowledge).
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The disturbance can invalidate once again the very construct that explains it
Recursive self-invalidation appears when the person interprets the symptom through a core construct and the symptom invalidates that same construct again. Anxiety may be interpreted as proof of weakness and generate further threat; depression may appear to be evidence of ineffectiveness and produce further despair; the fear of losing control may become the very sign supposedly confirming that control is already being lost. (Semerari, A., & Mancini, F., 1987, Recursive Self-Invalidation in Neurotic Processes; Gardner, G. G., Mancini, F., & Semerari, A., 1988, Construction of Psychological Disorders as Invalidation of Self-Knowledge).
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The mechanism mainly explains the maintenance and aggravation of suffering
The formulation does not hold that every psychological disturbance necessarily originates in the recursive construing of the symptom. Its principal value lies in explaining why some people remain for years in a constructive transition, why certain symptoms worsen disproportionately, and why the experience can become dramatically more intense even without any new external invalidation. (Gardner, G. G., Mancini, F., & Semerari, A., 1988, Construction of Psychological Disorders as Invalidation of Self-Knowledge).
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A scarcity of alternatives facilitates the vicious circle
A poorly articulated system of constructs offers few points of view from which to interpret a disturbance. When there are no alternatives to the construction in transition, the patient necessarily interprets the symptom through the very framework that is being invalidated; the vicious circle becomes established more easily and, by repeating itself, further impoverishes the availability of alternative constructions. (Gardner, G. G., Mancini, F., & Semerari, A., 1988, Construction of Psychological Disorders as Invalidation of Self-Knowledge).
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The problematic subsystem persists because it retains explanatory capacity
The symptom is threatening because it invalidates a preferred pole of the construct, but it also keeps active the subsystem that makes it possible to explain it. From the Choice Corollary, a person continues to elaborate part of their system when that part appears useful for anticipating events, even though its application produces continual threat and suffering. This paradox explains why a patient can remain attached to a painful construction without this implying that they wish to suffer. (Kelly, G. A., 1955, The Psychology of Personal Constructs; Gardner, G. G., Mancini, F., & Semerari, A., 1988, Construction of Psychological Disorders as Invalidation of Self-Knowledge).
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The intervention needs to be situated at an intermediate level of abstraction
Constructs that are too superordinate may be so core that questioning them directly generates intense threat and resistance; constructs that are too subordinate may be minimally threatening but insufficient to modify the circle. The most fertile target is situated at the level where the recursiveness closes, or at a level immediately more abstract, because it makes it possible to widen alternatives without provoking excessive disorganisation of identity. (Gardner, G. G., Mancini, F., & Semerari, A., 1988, Construction of Psychological Disorders as Invalidation of Self-Knowledge).
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Widening the self preserves values and makes their demands more flexible
Change does not require abandoning values such as autonomy, responsibility, strength, goodness or competence. It requires construing them more broadly, in a way that can include vulnerability, the need for support, doubt, sadness, anger, error or uncertainty without these experiences being automatically translated as the feared pole of identity. (Kelly, G. A., 1955, The Psychology of Personal Constructs; Semerari, A., & Mancini, F., 1987, Recursive Self-Invalidation in Neurotic Processes).
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The therapeutic relationship can provide a position outside the paradox
The revision of constructions requires a relationship that is not absorbed by the very logic organising the symptom. When the patient can construe the therapist through meanings different from those sustaining the principal threat, the relationship offers a context from which to explore alternatives without having to demonstrate obedience, avoid displeasing or confirm a feared identity. (Gardner, G. G., Mancini, F., & Semerari, A., 1988, Construction of Psychological Disorders as Invalidation of Self-Knowledge).
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The person can reconstruct their suffering when they differentiate experience from inference
Change begins when the patient can distinguish between an emotion, symptom or behaviour and the global judgement they draw from that experience. Feeling anxiety, sadness, guilt, anger or doubt can be real and painful without constituting definitive proof about the person's worth, competence or identity; this distinction opens up the possibility of constructing alternative hypotheses and putting them to the test. (Mancini, F., & Semerari, A., 1988, Kelly and Popper: A Constructivist View of Knowledge; Gardner, G. G., Mancini, F., & Semerari, A., 1988, Construction of Psychological Disorders as Invalidation of Self-Knowledge).
Influences
- Personal Construct Theory (PCP)
- Karl Popper's critical falsificationism
- Clinical problem solving
- Theory of construct invalidation
Key references
- Semerari, A., & Mancini, F. (1987). Recursive Self-Invalidation in Neurotic Processes. Paper presented at the Seventh International Congress of Personal Construct Psychology, Memphis, Tennessee.
- Gardner, G. G., Mancini, F., & Semerari, A. (1988). Construction of Psychological Disorders as Invalidation of Self-Knowledge. In F. Fransella & L. F. Thomas (Eds.), Experimenting with Personal Construct Psychology (pp. 259–272). Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Mancini, F., & Semerari, A. (1988). Kelly and Popper: A Constructivist View of Knowledge. In F. Fransella & L. F. Thomas (Eds.), Experimenting with Personal Construct Psychology (pp. 69–78). Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Kelly, G. A. (1955). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. Norton.
- Bannister, D. (1984). Il cambiamento psicoterapeutico dal punto di vista della Teoria dei Costrutti Personali. In G. Chiari & M. L. Nuzzo (Eds.), Crescita e cambiamento della conoscenza individuale. Franco Angeli.
- Mancini, F., Sassaroli, S., & Semerari, A. (1980). Problem solving e organizzazione cognitiva in psicoterapia. Archivio di Psicologia, Neurologia e Psichiatria, 41(2), 194–215.
- Mancini, F., Chiari, G., & Gardner, G. G. (1981). Un modello della psicoterapia come problem solving. In V. F. Guidano & M. A. Reda (Eds.), Cognitivismo e psicoterapia. Franco Angeli.
- Watzlawick, P., Weakland, J. H., & Fish, R. (1974). Change: Principles of Problem Formation and Problem Resolution. W. W. Norton.
- Mancini, F., & Semerari, A. (1990). Emozioni e sistemi cognitivi: le teorie cognitive della sofferenza emotiva. In F. Mancini & A. Semerari (Eds.), Le teorie cognitive dei disturbi emotivi. La Nuova Italia Scientifica.
- Mancini, F., & Semerari, A. (1991). Cognitivismo e condotte nevrotiche. In T. Magri & F. Mancini (Eds.), Emozione e conoscenza. Editori Riuniti.
- Mancini, F. (1996). L’egodistonia. In B. Bara (Ed.), Manuale di psicoterapia cognitiva. Bollati Boringhieri.
- Mancini, F., & Gangemi, A. (2004). Il ragionamento emozionale come fattore di mantenimento della patologia. Sistemi Intelligenti, 16(2), 237–254.
- Mancini, F. (2007). I meccanismi ricorsivi di mantenimento ed aggravamento delle disfunzioni cognitive. In L. Isola & F. Mancini (Eds.), Manuale di psicoterapia cognitiva per l’età evolutiva. Franco Angeli.
- Couyoumdjian, A., Ottaviani, C., Petrocchi, N., Trincas, R., Tenore, K., Buonanno, C., & Mancini, F. (2016). Reducing the Meta-Emotional Problem Decreases Physiological Fear Response during Exposure in Phobics. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1105. [https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01105](https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01105)