Cognitive · 1974

Cognitive biases (Kahneman and Tversky)

Error is not a lack of intelligence: it is the price of thinking fast.

A set of heuristics, fallacies and systematic biases of human judgement described in the Heuristics & Biases programme and in Kahneman's later work (Prospect Theory and Thinking, Fast and Slow). These phenomena show how, under uncertainty, the mind gives priority to automatic shortcuts (System 1) in order to produce rapid, coherent impressions, while deliberative reasoning (System 2) enters late, with effort and often only to justify decisions already taken. Clinically, these biases help to explain why intelligent patients hold on to rigid conclusions, magnify risks or read hostile intentions without sufficient evidence: it is not a lack of will, but a predictable cognitive architecture. Therapeutic work uses them to increase metacognition, open up alternatives, introduce base-rate data and dismantle the defensive narratives that maintain suffering.